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ABSTRACT 
This thesis takes a closer look at some of the prominent corruption cases such as 
the Mensalão, Operation Lava Jato, and the Odebrecht scandal and concentrates on the 
elements that exposed their existence. Although these corruption schemes had been in 
operation for some time before their manifestations, it was not until 
distinctive mechanisms were introduced into Brazilian politics that the impunity of the 
policy makers began to be challenged. The primary question addressed in this thesis is: 
Why is political corruption in Brazil being recognized now, and why are political 
leaders finally being held accountable? While many studies attempt to prove or 
disprove the many causes that lead to corruption, this study takes a slightly different 
approach. Instead of focusing on the sources, it identifies the factors that have 
caused the country to finally hold its political leaders accountable. This thesis 
identifies two key factors that are responsible: the implementation of the plea bargain 
and the media. As Brazil’s corruption scandals continue to be exposed, the 
international community can learn from the loopholes and flaws that allowed for 
them and install the necessary safeguards to protect their democracies. 
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A. MAJOR RESEARCH QUESTION 
Brazil has increasingly become synonymous with political corruption. According 
to Transparency International’s Corruption Perception Index, Brazil is ranked 96 out of 
180 countries.1 The new democracy, only emerging from authoritarian rule in 1985, has 
now become the focal point for illegal political practices and doubts regarding the 
preservation of its democratic consolidation trajectory. While the rest of the Latin 
America also suffers from similar problems, Brazil stands out due to the amount of 
attention it has recently received regarding the huge strides it has taken to rid its political 
system of the worst offenders. The Mensalão Scandal2 and Operation Lava Jato3 have all 
but become household terms associated with the corruption schemes that are engulfing 
the country. While the world community watches from a distance, the Brazilian 
population is demanding more accountability from its political leaders.4 
The question this thesis seeks to answer is this: why is political corruption in 
Brazil being recognized now and why are political leaders finally being held 
accountable? While many studies attempt to prove or disprove the many causes that lead 
to corruption, this study takes a slightly different approach. Instead of focusing on the 
sources, it will identify the factors that have caused the country to finally hold its political 
leaders accountable. Furthermore, it will address some of the implications of the 
newfound accountability in the political realm. This thesis argues that the instruments of 
                                                 
1 Transparency International, “Corruption Perceptions Index 2017,” www.transparency.org, accessed 
February 27, 2018, https://www.transparency.org/news/feature/corruption_perceptions_index_2017. 
2 Gregory Michener and Carlos Pereira, “A Great Leap Forward for Democracy and the Rule of Law? 
Brazil’s Mensalão Trial,” Journal of Latin American Studies 48, no. 03 (August 2016): 477–507, 
https://doi.org/10.1017/S0022216X16000377. 
3 “Entenda a Operação Lava Jato - Poder - Folha de S.Paulo,” accessed November 2, 2017, 
http://arte.folha.uol.com.br/poder/operacao-lava-jato/. 
4 The Lava Jato investigation has made so many outlandish discoveries and attracted so much interest 
from the international community that it there is now a Netflix series based on the scandal called “The 
Mechanism.” For more information, see https://www.nytimes.com/2018/03/16/arts/television/mechanism-
netflix-brazil-jose-padilha.html. 
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the plea bargain and the media played the biggest roles in the exposure of corruption in 
Brazil. 
B. SIGNIFICANCE OF THE RESEARCH QUESTION 
For the last three decades, Brazil has enjoyed the freedoms and liberty associated 
with democratic governance and is considered one of Latin America’s most important 
stories in transitioning from authoritarian rule given its size, population, and influence.5 
Since its transition to democracy in 1985, Brazil has experienced a great deal of 
economic growth and has gained international attention as a strong emerging market. 
With vast amounts of natural resources as well as agricultural and manufacturing know-
how, the country is recognized as an economic powerhouse and ranks as the ninth highest 
GDP in the world.6 This economic development has helped spark a series of social 
welfare programs, such as the Bolsa Família that has lifted some forty million people out 
of poverty and serves as a model for other nations around the world.7 As the country 
continues to shape its identity as the regional hegemon, the need to understand the 
growing problem of corruption becomes increasingly important. 
Most literature has focused on the causes of corruption in Brazil. This study 
attempts to highlight the reasons for the lack of accountability until recent times, and thus 
contributes to the scholarly works on Brazil. This thesis also incorporates Portuguese 
language sources in addition to English in order to offer further insights and perspectives. 
Understanding how corruption is identified in Brazil could help Brazilian political leaders 
reshape their administrative systems to avoid it in the future and strengthen the 
institutions which bolster democracy. By comprehending the Brazilian experience with 
corruption, other countries may be able to learn from the mistakes and shortcomings of 
Brazil’s government and make the necessary changes within their own governmental 
                                                 
5 Scott Mainwaring, “The Transition to Democracy in Brazil,” Journal of Interamerican Studies and 
World Affairs 28, no. 1 (1986): 149–79, https://doi.org/10.2307/165739, 149. 
6 “GDP Ranking | Data,” accessed October 25, 2017, https://data.worldbank.org/data-catalog/GDP-
ranking-table. 




structure. By implementing anti-corruption measures, states can increase their ability to 
reduce unethical political practices that threaten economic growth and stability, as well as 
the credibility of global financial intercourse.8 As Brazil’s corruption scandals continue 
to be exposed, the international community can learn from the loopholes and flaws that 
allowed for their formation.  
C. LITERATURE REVIEW 
This literature review covers the several schools of thought that attempt to explain 
the reason for the exposure of corruption in Brazil and what it means for their democracy, 
security, and the potential for political reform. The first topic to address is that of 
scholarly work on political corruption.  
1. “Rouba, Mas Faz” 
One school of thought ascribes the change in attitude toward corruption to a low 
return on investment for the amount of taxes collected by their government. For a long 
time, it was generally known and accepted that corruption existed in politics and 
business. The term “rouba, mas faz”—he steals, but does—was brought into the 
vernacular by the national press of Brazil to designate politicians who are corrupt, but are 
able to get laws passed and improve the conditions of their constituents.9 Although 
Brazilians enjoy a modern lifestyle, they became increasingly aware of their high tax rate 
compared to the mediocre public services return they receive in exchange. In June of 
2013, public indignation reached a high point and massive public demonstrations took 
place across the country in protest of substandard government aid in areas such as health, 
infrastructure, and education while investing heavily in preparation for the 2014 World 
Cup and again for the 2016 Olympics.10  
                                                 
8 Matthew M. Taylor, “What U.S. Policymakers Can Learn from Brazil’s Anticorruption Gains,” 
Council on Foreign Relations, March 2017, https://www.cfr.org/report/what-us-policymakers-can-learn-
brazils-anticorruption-gains. 
9 Robert Bonifácio, “A Afeição Dos Cidadãos Pelos Políticos Mal-Afamados: Identificando Os Perfis 
Associados À Aceitação Do ‘Rouba, Mas Faz’ No Brasil,” Opinião Pública 19, no. 2 (November 2013): 
320–45, https://doi.org/10.1590/S0104-62762013000200004. 
10 Thomas C. Bruneau, “The Impeachment of President Dilma Rousseff: Old Politics Meets New 
Standards in Brazil,” 2016, 6. 
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Although political demonstrations had occurred in the past, the magnitude of 
these protests was largely attributed to the fact that a bigger portion of Brazil’s population 
had a vested interest in where their tax money was being spent. A key indicator of this is 
the portion of the people who actually paid taxes. One study conducted by Ernst & 
Young Terco and subsequently published by Pulsamérica in 2013 shows that for the first 
time, “50.3% of Brazilians who declared income, now pay income tax, which accounts to 
roughly 12 million people. A decade ago, only 36.2% (or 5.5 million) of those who 
declared income, paid income tax.”11 Furthermore, data gathered by another source 
indicates that “of the thirty countries where taxes are the highest, Brazil is the worst in 
terms of return to the population in investments in the quality of life.”12 
Linz and Stepan note the problems that Brazil faces regarding social welfare and 
the political stalemate situation. According to them, Brazil has by far the most unequal 
distribution of income and the worst social welfare and educational standards of any of 
the European and South American countries in their data set.13 Although several different 
reform packages were launched, none have been successful at being implemented—
further weakening the value that citizens place on the effectiveness of political 
institutions and exacerbated by the ups and downs of the financial market.14  
2. Accountability and Rule of Law 
Another school of thought considered to be a contributor in the exposure of 
corruption in Brazil is the concept of accountability. Power and Taylor define the term 
accountability as “the answerability of public officials for the public-regarding nature and 
                                                 
11 Maria Luiza Gatto, “Brazil: Over 12 Million Currently Pay Income Tax,” Pulsamerica, accessed 
November 30, 2017, http://www.pulsamerica.co.uk/2013/02/brazil-over-12-million-currently-pay-income-
tax/, http://www.pulsamerica.co.uk/2013/02/brazil-over-12-million-currently-pay-income-tax/. 
12 Bruneau, “The Impeachment of President Dilma Rousseff: Old Politics Meets New Standards in 
Brazil.” 
13 Juan J. Linz and Alfred Stepan, Problems of Democratic Transition and Consolidation: Southern 
Europe, South America, and Post-Communist Europe (JHU Press, 1996). This data set included Spain, 
Portugal, Greece, Brazil, Argentina, Chile, Uruguay, the former USSR, Poland, Hungary, Czechoslovakia, 
Romania, and Bulgaria. 
14 Linz and Stepan, 167. 
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probity of their actions.”15 In an article published in 1990 in the Revista de 
Administração Pública, Anna Maria Campos convincingly argues why there is no 
concept or translation for the word “accountability” in Portuguese.16 The word that most 
closely resembles it is responsabilidade—responsibility—which does not convey the 
principle of ultimately having to take ownership of one’s actions. She states that Brazilian 
bureaucracy is full of characteristics tied to the absence of accountability including weak 
institutions, immunity from external controls, and lack of transparency.17  
In modern democracies, accountability is essential for corruption control. 
According to Linz and Stepan, “it implies that all financial records will be routinely 
subject to inspection and that it is the obligation of the officials who use public funds to 
follow transparent procedures.”18 Equally important is the concept of the rule of law. It 
implies that those who treat state resources as their own will be held liable and punished 
if found guilty of illegal acts. The rule of law is weak in Brazil because state officials are 
perceived by the population not to administer justice equally among its citizens.19 
Political leaders break the law with impunity. This climate has changed recently—set in 
motion with the Mensalão scandal in 2005 and further gaining momentum with the 
impeachment of Dilma Rousseff after being charged with manipulating the federal 
budget.20 
3. Plea-Bargaining 
The Brazilian political system has been characterized as sluggish and convoluted. 
Instead of abiding by formal laws and institutions, Brazilians often turned to informal 
                                                 
15 Timothy J. Power and Matthew M. Taylor, Corruption and Democracy in Brazil (Notre Dame, IN: 
University of Notre Dame Press, 2011), 6. 
16 Anna Maria Campos, “Accountability: Quando Poderemos Traduzi-La Para O Português?,” Revista 
de Administração Pública 24, no. 2 (June 12, 1990): 30–50. 
17 Campos, 42.  
18 Juan J. Linz and Alfred Stepan, Problems of Democratic Transition and Consolidation: Southern 
Europe, South America, and Post-Communist Europe (JHU Press, 1996), 179. 
19 Linz and Stepan, 179. 
20 Simon Romero, “Dilma Rousseff Is Ousted as Brazil’s President in Impeachment Vote,” The New 
York Times, August 31, 2016, sec. Americas, https://www.nytimes.com/2016/09/01/world/americas/brazil-
dilma-rousseff-impeached-removed-president.html. 
 6 
avenues to get something done. These “jeitinhos,” are sometimes the only method to 
circumvent the slow-moving bureaucracy for which Brazil is infamous.21 “Jeitinhos”—or 
little ways or gimmicks—is a term that is easier to describe than it is to define. One 
sociologist defines the idea as “an ingenious maneuver that renders the impossible, 
possible; the unjust, just; and the illegal, legal.”22 Plea bargaining in Brazil was 
implemented in its current form only in 2013—partly to combat this obstacle to 
development and partly to comply with OECD standards—as an incentive for those 
charged in white-collar criminal acts to receive reduced prison sentences.23 As a result, 
after the arrest of Senator Delcídio do Amaral, leader of the Partido dos Trabalhadores 
(Worker’s Party), key information was obtained regarding the spread of corruption in the 
Brazilian government, which ultimately led to the impeachment of President Dilma 
Rousseff.24 Plea-bargaining has since been effective in ousting several other political 
elites engaged in illicit activities. 
4. Effects on Democracy, Security, and the Potential for Political Reform 
A review of the literature on how corruption affects democracy, security, and the 
potential for political reform reveals that there are two polarizing views. Samuel 
Huntington has stated that corruption is something that is experienced by all societies and 
is associated with intense economic and social modernization.25 He argues that 
corruption—in low doses—is actually beneficial for societies to experience: 
Corruption provides immediate, specific, and concrete benefits to groups 
which  might otherwise be thoroughly alienated from society. Corruption 
may thus be functional to the maintenance of a political system in the 
same way that reform is. Corruption itself maybe a substitute for reform 
and both corruption and reform may be substitutes for revolution. 
                                                 
21 Bruneau, “The Impeachment of President Dilma Rousseff: Old Politics Meets New Standards in 
Brazil.” 
22 Keith Rosenn, “The ‘Jeito’: Brazil’s Institutional Bypass of the Formal Legal System and Its 
Developmental Implications,” The American Journal of Comparative Law 19, no. 3 (1971): 514. 
23 Bruneau, “The Impeachment of President Dilma Rousseff: Old Politics Meets New Standards in 
Brazil.” 
24 Bruneau. 
25 Samuel P Huntington, Political Order in Changing Societies (New Haven, Conn.: Yale University 
Press, 1968), 59. 
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Corruption serves to reduce group pressures for policy changes, just as 
reform serves to reduce class pressures for structural changes.26 
In addition to Huntington, several other scholars including Nathaniel Leff27 and 
Joseph Nye28 have written extensively regarding the positive effect that corruption can 
have on developing economies. According to them, it can also be reasonably construed 
that similar levels of corruption could be beneficial to democracy, security, and political 
reform. Leff points out that bureaucratic corruption can act as a hedge against bad policy 
and highlights several examples where entrepreneurs subverted shortsighted regulations 
and were later attributed with the change of laws.29 
While some view corruption as a method to “grease the wheels” of a developing 
democracy, the opposing argument is that corruption has a negative effect on the 
democracy and security of a country. According to one scholar, “corruption costs Brazil 
an estimated 3 to 5 percent of GDP annually.”30 The true cost of corruption, however, 
cannot be measured because of the intangible effects it has on the perception of the 
legitimacy of the government. An example of this is a poll conducted in 2005 that 
showed between an 8 and 9 percent approval rating of the nation’s political actors.31 As 
seen in Figure 1, Brazil’s population is losing trust in its policy makers—a situation that 
has led to uprisings in the past. This is a problem that contributes to instability and the 
legitimacy of the democracy. 
                                                 
26 Huntington, 64. 
27 Nathaniel H Leff, “Economic Development Through Bureaucratic Corruption,” American 
Behavioral Scientist 8, no. 3 (1964): 8–14, https://doi.org/10.1177/000276426400800303. 
28 Joseph S Nye Jr., “Corruption and Political Development: A Cost-Benefit Analysis,” American 
Political Science Review 61, no. 2 (1967): 417–27, https://doi.org/10.2307/1953254. 
29 Leff, “Economic Development Through Bureaucratic Corruption.” 
30 Taylor, “What U.S. Policymakers Can Learn From Brazil’s Anticorruption Gains.” 
31 Power and Taylor, Corruption and Democracy in Brazil, 2–3. 
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Figure 1.  Brazilians’ Approval of Political Leadership32 
Also worth mentioning is the phenomenon of regression, which is a possible 
effect that corruption could have on Brazil’s democracy. Brazil’s transition to democracy 
has been extraordinarily lengthy compared to other transitions and some even consider 
the country to still be in a transitional stage. According to  and Bruneau, some of the 
reasons for the stall in democratization have been hangovers from the dictatorships 
including corruption, favoritism, nepotism, bribery, and blackmail, which have made 
democratic control very difficult.33 Governments in transition have historically proven to 
be vulnerable to decline and regression. They argue that if steps are not taken to ensure 
the protection of basic human rights and bring security services under civilian democratic 
control and oversight, they are in danger of regressing back into authoritarian control.34 
Juan Linz also adds that the decay of authenticity, efficiency, and ultimate legitimacy of a 
                                                 
32 Source: Jesus Rios and Julie Ray, “Brazilians’ Trust in Country’s Leadership at Record Low,” 
Gallup, April 7, 2016, http://news.gallup.com/poll/190481/brazilians-trust-country-leadership-record-
low.aspx. 
33 Florina Cristiana Matei and Thomas Bruneau, “Intelligence Reform in New Democracies: Factors 
Supporting or Arresting Progress,” Democratization 18, no. 3 (June 2011): 602–30, https://doi.org/10.1080/
13510347.2011.586257, 615. 
34 Matei and Bruneau, 615. 
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democratic government can lead to a generalized atmosphere of tension and are 
characterized by increased social mobilization and justification of corruption.35 Although 
democratic regression has not been experienced Brazil so far, several of the 
characteristics indicative of its presence have recently manifested themselves. Brazilians 
have gone to great lengths to consolidate their democracy. Still, further improvements 
need to be made in transparency and oversight mechanisms to fortify the democratic form 
of government it has struggled so long to achieve. 
D. POTENTIAL EXPLANATIONS AND HYPOTHESES 
The first potential hypothesis as to why corruption went unpunished for so long 
stems from the availability and censorship of information to the general populous. 
Reaching 95 percent of households, television media is considered to be a reliable source 
of information in Brazil.36 Brazilian media has long been controlled by a limited number 
of broadcasting networks with proven biases to certain political ideologies. One of these 
networks, Rede Globo, is watched by 91 million people each day and claims the majority 
of the television audience.37 In 2013, Globo admitted to supporting Brazil’s military 
dictatorship during its control of the government from 1964 to 1985.38 Examples such as 
this illustrate how the television news media is one of the possible contributing factors to 
government scandal cover-ups and one of the reasons that corruption has been able to 
remain hidden from the public.  
Although television has maintained a predominate place in Brazilian media, the 
tide has started to change with the huge advances in technology. In addition to television, 
the advent of the internet is another form of media that has allowed Brazilians to receive 
information from a variety of resources. Brazil is now the second most connected country 
                                                 
35 Juan J. (Juan José) Linz, The Breakdown of Democratic Regimes: Crisis, Breakdown, and 
Reequilibration (Baltimore, 1978), 75. 
36 Andrea Novais, “Brazilian’s Media Habits,” The Brazil Business, accessed November 6, 2017, 
http://thebrazilbusiness.com/article/brazilian-s-media-habits. 
37 Vincent Bevins, “Brazil’s Globo Group Apologizes for Backing Military Government,” Los Angeles 




in the world, according to comScore a digital analysis group, and leads the world with a 
99.9 percent reach of social media.39 Furthermore, Brazilians spend an average of 8.8 
hours per month of usage while Europe spends 6.1 hours, and the U.S. just 5.2 hours.40 
Like most of the world, Brazilians are increasingly turning away from other news sources 
and getting their information from social media sites like Facebook, YouTube, and 
Twitter. These forms of communication are less regulated and more transparent than 
television and radio have proven to be and provide a means for Brazilians to compare 
their governments with those around the world. The unethical political practices that 
would not have otherwise been covered by domestic sources are now being exposed 
through these social media sites. 
Where the information hypothesis argues that politicians have been able to 
practice unethical behavior because the public was misinformed, a second hypothesis has 
to do with the implementation of plea bargaining within the judicial system. This 
instrument in its legal form has allowed the prosecution of several corruption cases 
advance by leaps and bounds. Prior to its inception, those accused of corruption had no 
incentive to give information relating to their illicit dealings. Recently, plea bargaining 
was institutionalized within Brazilian courts and has since been cited as one of the 
principal reasons for the swelling of the corruption investigation associated with 
corruption such as Mensalão and Lava Jato.41 
E. RESEARCH DESIGN 
The research design is the single case study of the country of Brazil. Brazil has a 
unique history and economic position compared with the rest of Latin America that 
makes it difficult to compare it to other countries within the region. Although several 
comparisons have been made to the southern cone states of Argentina, Chile, Paraguay, 
and Uruguay, none of these countries have experienced the level of corruption, nor the 
                                                 
39 “ComScore & Shareablee: The State of Social Media in Brazil,” comScore, Inc., September 22, 
2015, http://www.comscore.com/Insights/Presentations-and-Whitepapers/2015/comScore-Shareablee-The-
State-of-Social-Media-in-Brazil. 
40 “ComScore & Shareablee.” 
41 Michener and Pereira, “A Great Leap Forward for Democracy and the Rule of Law?” 
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amount of international attention as has Brazil. Within this single case study however, I 
intend to use several domestic cases including the Mensalão and Lava Jato scandals as 
well as the impeachment of President and Dilma Rouseff to ascertain the reason why 
manifestations of corruption are on the rise. These incidents are not the only examples of 
corruption in Brazil, but they certainly are most wide-reaching and infamous.  
Analyzing the previously mentioned corruption scandals, an analysis will be 
conducted to discover how these scandals came to light. I will then investigate what 
changed in the social, political, and economic realms that caused a higher demand for 
accountability within Brazilian politics.  
F. THESIS OVERVIEW AND CHAPTER OUTLINE 
This thesis will be written in an order where each chapter builds a foundation for 
subsequent chapters. It will allow the reader to gain an understanding of the complexities 
regarding the research question. Chapter II will give a summary of the most prominent 
corruption cases—Mensalão, Lava Jato, and the Odebrecht scandals. Chapter III will 
analyze the various corruption cases and concentrate on the various issues that have given 
rise to the exposure of graft in Brazil. Chapter IV will summarize the main findings of the 
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II. BRAZIL: A SLEEPING GIANT BOUND BY CORRUPTION 
Corruption is nothing new to Brazil. There have been countless instances of 
corruption cases that went unpunished and acabam em pizza—a Brazilian Portuguese 
term that translates literally “to end in pizza,” which conveys the notion that 
investigations are often inconclusive and never result in anything, leaving the accused to 
take the investigator out for pizza. The data mirrors this phrase and shows that out of 100 
cases of corruption in Brazil, 97 end up with no conviction.42 While it is nearly 
impossible to determine the actual economic costs associated with corruption, recent 
estimates suggest that corruption in Brazil may account for 1.35 to 5 percent of GDP.43  
Whatever the cost, the problem is significant enough for many international 
institutions to take note including the OECD and the World Bank. The reality is that the 
country suffers from a huge corruption problem that until recently has been pursued in 
vain due to the element of impunity of the Brazilian political elite. This chapter will take 
a closer look at some of the economic implications associated with some of the major 
corruption scandals that have plagued Brazil specifically during the last decade. Although 
corruption has existed in various forms throughout the country’s history, this time period 
differs in that it is finally being prosecuted and public officials are actually serving jail 
time as a result—an anomaly in a society where the elite historically have been immune 
from legal action. 
A. CORRUPTION SCANDALS IN BRAZIL 
According to Transparency International, Brazil is ranked 96 out of 180 countries 
on the corruption perceptions index of 2017.44 That number is especially surprising when 
considering that Brazil is the world’s ninth largest economy—home to a staggering $1.8 
                                                 
42 Transparency International, Operation Carwash Task Force: Anti-Corruption Award Winners 2016, 
accessed February 27, 2018, https://www.youtube.com/watch?time_continue=62&v=gHK9HhzaPog. 
43 Timothy J. Power and Matthew M. Taylor, Corruption and Democracy in Brazil (Notre Dame, IN: 
University of Notre Dame Press, 2011), 1. 
44 “Corruption Perceptions Index 2017.” 
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trillion and representing 2.4 percent of the global total (see Figure 2).45 Freedom House 
grades Brazil as a “free” democracy, with political rights, civil liberties, and freedom of 
the press rated as “partly free.”46 One would think that a country that ranks among other 
world powers such as the United States, Canada, and Japan in terms of democratic 
consolidation and economic power would have somewhat similar rankings in terms of 
corruption control (see Figure 3). In fact, Brazil ranks the worst in terms of corruption out 
of all the other countries listed in the top ten most powerful economies.47 Additionally, 
the Latin American giant is the only country in the top ten to register a decline in growth 
(-3.5 percent).48 Could corruption be partly to blame? The UN estimates that $60 billion 
are embezzled every year in Brazil.49 Deltan Dallagnol, a Brazilian federal prosecutor 
states that with that money, “we [Brazil] could triple the national budget on health 
services or education; we could also multiply by five the public safety budget in our 
country; we could have ten more schools per year in every Brazilian town.”50 
                                                 
45 “The World’s 10 Biggest Economies in 2017,” World Economic Forum, accessed February 27, 
2018, https://www.weforum.org/agenda/2017/03/worlds-biggest-economies-in-2017/. 
46 Freedom House, “Freedom in the World 2018: Brazil,” January 4, 2018, https://freedomhouse.org/
report/freedom-world/2018/brazil. 
47 “Corruption Perceptions Index 2017.” 
48 “The World’s 10 Biggest Economies in 2017.” 
49 Transparency International, “Brazil’s Carwash Task Force Wins Transparency International Anti-
Corruption Award,” www.transparency.org, accessed February 27, 2018, https://www.transparency.org/
news/pressrelease/brazils_carwash_task_force_wins_transparency_international_anti_corruption. 
50 Transparency International, Operation Carwash Task Force. 
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Figure 2.  The Global Economy by GDP51 
 
 
Figure 3.  The World’s Top 10 Economies52 
                                                 
51 Source: “The World’s 10 Biggest Economies in 2017,” World Economic Forum, accessed February 
27, 2018, https://www.weforum.org/agenda/2017/03/worlds-biggest-economies-in-2017/. 
52 Source: “The World’s 10 Biggest Economies in 2017.” 
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Where did Brazil go wrong? What makes Brazil such a hotbed for corruption, 
including bribery, nepotism, and clientelism? While there is not one specific reason that 
gives a satisfactory explanation, there are however, some recent corruption cases that can 
offer some insight on the process of exposing corruption and its prosecution. 
1. Mensalão 
President Lula (2003-2011) won the presidency in 2002, elected on the promise to 
rid Brasília of corruption. Upon taking office the following year, he was stuck with a 
minority of Worker’s Party (PT) members that would have allowed him to pass 
legislation.53 Due to the nature of Brazil’s political system, political parties are small and 
have weak ideological identities with little power to enforce loyalty among their 
members, which often leaves presidents to bargain with legislators individually to get 
laws passed.54 Specifically, when Lula assumed the presidency, his party held less than 
18 percent of the seats in the Chamber of Deputies and less than 13 percent in the 
senate.55 In an attempt to garner the support that he needed, Lula expanded his cabinet 
from 21 to 34 positions, filling 60 percent of them with members of the PT.56 The PT 
secured votes for projects it wanted to fund by purchasing the political support of 
opposing party members using public monies.57 
 The scandal came to light on June 6, 2005, when Roberto Jefferson of the 
Brazilian Labor Party (PTB) revealed the scheme in a newspaper interview where he 
revealed that the PT was paying several congressmen the equivalent of $12,000 per 
month in exchange for their votes.58 The scandal became known as the Mensalão—or big 
                                                 
53 Power and Taylor, Corruption and Democracy in Brazil, 33. 
54 B Winter, “Brazil’s Never-Ending Corruption Crisis Why Radical Transparency Is the Only Fix,” 
Foreign Affairs 96, no. 3 (2017): 87–94. 
55 Global Security, “Brazil - Political Parties,” March 5, 2016, https://www.globalsecurity.org/military/
world/brazil/political-parties.htm. 
56 Alfred P Montero, Brazil: Reversal of Fortune (Polity Press, 2014), 43. 
57 HJ, “What Is Brazil’s ‘Mensalão’?,” The Economist, November 18, 2013, 
https://www.economist.com/blogs/economist-explains/2013/11/economist-explains-14. 
58 HJ.  
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monthly allowance—and resulted in several members of congress, their staff, and a 
handful of bank employees being indicted on a variety of criminal charges.59  
Because so many of the accused were members of Congress, according to 
Brazilian law, only the Supreme Court had jurisdiction over the case.60 Several attempts 
were made to sweep the scandal under the rug, in the hopes that the public would forget, 
but the media was relentless in their coverage of the scandal. Due to all the loopholes in 
the judicial system, defendants were successful in slow-rolling the process, requesting 
appeals and retrials when a few judges had voted for acquittal.61 The judicial process is 
anything but swift in Brazil and it was not until seven years later, in mid-2012 that the 
trials finally began.62  
The delay was mainly due to the fact that the Brazilian constitution allows for a 
special standing (foro privilegiado in Portuguese) for top-tier policy makers. As 
Michener and Pereira point out, this “special standing grants officials a greater number of 
witnesses and numerous opportunities for clarification and appeal, all of which tend to 
extend proceedings.”63 It is important to highlight that while the trial was tied up in 
bureaucracy, Lula was reelected to serve a second term as president, despite swirling 
evidence that connected him to the scandal. Policy makers in congress did their best to 
change laws and threaten accountability institutions in Brazil and it seemed once again 
that the case would “end in pizza.” Even when the Supreme Court found 25 of the 
original 40 defendants guilty, there were more appeals and that did little to stir any 
optimism about justice being served.64 Finally, in an unprecedented display of 
accountability, the indicted politicians were delivered their sentences before a gauntlet of 
news media on November 15, 2013—the anniversary day of the Proclamation of the 
                                                 
59 Power and Taylor, Corruption and Democracy in Brazil, 34. 
60 Gregory Michener and Carlos Pereira, “A Great Leap Forward for Democracy and the Rule of Law? 
Brazil’s Mensalão Trial,” Journal of Latin American Studies 48, no. 03 (August 2016): 477–507, 
https://doi.org/10.1017/S0022216X16000377, 482. 
61 HJ, “What Is Brazil’s ‘Mensalão’?” 
62 HJ. 
63 Michener and Pereira, “A Great Leap Forward for Democracy and the Rule of Law?” 482. 
64 Michener and Pereira. 484. 
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Brazilian Republic.65 In all, prison sentences for the Mensalão trial totaled 283 years and 
fines totaled $10 million.66  
The Mensalão scandal and subsequent convictions served as a kind of revolution 
within Brazilian culture. It was the first time that high-level politicians and other 
members of the elite class were held accountable. “Só pobres ficam presos,” or “only the 
poor go to jail” is a popular saying among Brazilians and demonstrates the long history of 
impunity that has existed since the foundation of the republic in 1891. It also served to 
highlight some of the weaknesses associated with a political system in which there are 
several small, weak parties that rely principally on outside funding in order to effectively 
compete in elections.67 Additionally, it underscored the crucial role of the media in 
maintaining the public’s attention throughout the course of the scandal and how that 
attention served as an impetus for the pursuit of justice.  
2. Operation Lava Jato 
Operation Lava Jato is the name given to one of the biggest financial scandals in 
Brazil’s history. This corruption case gained an enormous amount of attention, both 
domestically and internationally due to the reach and scope of its operation. The 
investigation is ongoing, but has already implicated 83 politicians with the collaboration 
of authorities in 30 different countries.68 Additionally, this was another (until then) rare 
occasion where Brazil’s political elite were being held accountable and were actually 
being prosecuted in Brazilian courts. Although the case was initially thought to be 
another money laundering investigation, it has since been discovered to be much more 
far-reaching and implicates the national oil company, Petrobras as well as the then 
                                                 
65 Michener and Pereira, 485. 
66 Michener and Pereira, 484. 
67 For more information on the party system of Brazil, see Alfred P Montero, Brazil: Reversal of 
Fortune (Polity Press, 2014) and Timothy J. Power, “Optimism, Pessimism, and Coalitional 
Presidentialism: Debating the Institutional Design of Brazilian Democracy,” Bulletin of Latin American 
Research 29, no. 1 (January 2010): 18–33, https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1470-9856.2009.00304.x.. 
68 Transparency International, Operation Carwash Task Force. 
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President of Brazil, Dilma Rousseff (2011-2016).69 To date the Lava Jato investigations 
are responsible for more than 240 criminal charges, 118 convictions totaling 1,256 years 
of prison time.70 This has resulted in the recovery of $200 million returned to the state-
owned oil company, Petrobras as well as $735 million in frozen assets and $11.3 billion 
in refunds and legal penalties.71 
The investigation started in mid-2013, when Brazilian federal police officers 
noticed that one of the suspects they were investigating for running a black-market bank 
for the rich, Alberto Youssef, had recently purchased a high-end luxury SUV for 
R$250,000 (about $125,000).72 Vehicles of this size are rare in Brazil, let alone the fact 
that a striking black Land Rover Evoque is far out of reach for the average Brazilian. The 
SUV ended up as a gift to Paulo Roberto Costa, a former division manager at Petrobras 
and one of Youssef’s clients.73 The investigators had been following Youssef for quite a 
while in an attempt to build up a strong case against money-laundering operations, but 
this was the first time that the criminal was witnessed giving a gift to a former business 
executive. Youssef was a known doleiro—or money launderer—that had avoided prison 
time in the past due his willingness to cooperate with investigators, but it would turn out 
that he was simply a middleman in what would be uncovered as the farthest-reaching 
corruption scheme in Brazilian history.  
The scheme originated with bids for building contracts with Petrobras. Normally, 
when a company of this size wants to complete a project, it solicits for bids from a 
number of contractors. Once the bids for a particular project are received, Petrobras 
would then choose the contractor with the lowest bid to complete the work. Petrobras 
typically spends more than $20 billion a year in expansion projects, as well as in 
                                                 
69 Will Connors and Paulo Trevisani, “Brazil ‘Carwash’ Shrugs Off Notoriety Tied to Petrobras 
Scandal,” Wall Street Journal, June 21, 2015, sec. World, http://www.wsj.com/articles/brazil-carwash-
shrugs-off-notoriety-tied-to-petrobras-scandal-1434930402. 
70 Transparency International, Operation Carwash Task Force. 
71 Transparency International. 
72 Michael Smith, Sabrina Valle, and Blake Schmidt, “The Betrayal of Brazil,” Bloomberg.Com, May 
8, 2015, https://www.bloomberg.com/news/features/2015-05-08/brazil-s-massive-corruption-scandal-has-
bitterness-replacing-hope. 
73 Smith, Valle, and Schmidt. 
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additional new facilities.74 In this scheme, which lasted ten years, contracting firms 
would participate in a type of auction for Petrobras contracts wherein the lowest bidder 
would win the deal and be awarded the contract.75 Sometime in the 1990s, the contractors 
stopped competing with each other and began collaborating and formed a cartel in which 
they determine the winner of each project in advance of the bid. According to the Federal 
Public Ministry of Brazil, “the prices offered to Petrobras were calculated and adjusted in 
secret meetings that defined who would win the contract and what would be the price, 
inflated in private benefit and to the detriment of the state’s coffers.”76 This cartel called 
itself “the club” and had 16 members by 2006, including the juggernaut construction 
firm, Odebrecht (see Figure 4).77   
The name Lava Jato—car wash in Portuguese—stems from the doleiros’ use of a 
network of car washes and gas stations to launder illicit resources and distribute financial 
kickbacks to those involved in the scheme.78 Although there are numerous other 
institutions involved in the scandal, the name stuck and is now internationally recognized. 
The executives paid bribes ranging from 1 to 5 percent of the total amount of overpriced 
billion-dollar contracts to senior state executives and other public agents to allow the 
practice to continue.79 The cartel’s operations were so elaborate that they even had a 
three-page encoded guide which simulated rules of a football championship, to define 
how the projects would be distributed.80 In an attempt to camouflage the operations, the 
bidding plans as well as the contracts themselves were disguised to appear as bingo 
games in the event that the documents were to be found.81 
                                                 
74 Segal, “Petrobras Oil Scandal Leaves Brazilians Lamenting a Lost Dream.” 
75  “Entenda o Caso - Caso Lava Jato,” Página, accessed February 27, 2018, http://www.mpf.mp.br/
para-o-cidadao/caso-lava-jato/entenda-o-caso. 
76 “Entenda o Caso - Caso Lava Jato.” 
77 Segal, “Petrobras Oil Scandal Leaves Brazilians Lamenting a Lost Dream.” 
78 There exist several resources where information on the Lava Jato can be found. For a fairly brief 
overview in English, see https://www.bloomberg.com/news/features/2015-05-08/brazil-s-massive-
corruption-scandal-has-bitterness-replacing-hope 
79 “Entenda o Caso - Caso Lava Jato.” 
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Figure 4.  Lava Jato Scandal Explained82 
So how much did this corruption scandal cost the Brazilian taxpayers? As 
previously mentioned, and as many scholars have pointed out, the costs of corruption can 
never really be measured. One can however, look to some of the financial figures that 
have been gathered since the scandal was exposed in an effort to ascertain the financial 
penalties. According to the audited annual financial report released by Petrobras in 2015, 
the company lost $2.1 billion in bribery schemes and wrote-off almost $17 billion due to 
inflated assets, which were given as conservative estimates.83 The Getúlio Vargas 
Foundation’s Environmental Solutions and Infrastructure Group estimates that in all, 
Brazil lost $27.1 billion due to the effects of the Lava Jato scandal.84 Again, a hefty price 
tag considering that it accounts for a considerable portion of the national GDP.  
In Figure 5, one can see a representation of the Brazilian GDP from 1990 to 2016. 
What is immediately noticeable is peak that occurred in 2011 at $2.6 trillion, followed by 
a somewhat stalled three-year span and then a drastic drop occurring in 2014—right at 
                                                 
82 Source: Will Connors and Luciana Magalhaes, “How Brazil’s ‘Nine Horsemen’ Cracked a Bribery 
Scandal,” Brazil Energy Insight (blog), April 6, 2015, https://brazilenergyinsight.com/2015/04/06/how-
brazils-nine-horsemen-cracked-a-bribery-scandal/. 
83 Paul Kiernan, “Brazil’s Petrobras Reports Nearly $17 Billion in Asset and Corruption Charges,” 
Wall Street Journal, April 23, 2015, sec. Business, http://www.wsj.com/articles/brazils-petrobras-reports-
nearly-17-billion-impairment-on-assets-corruption-1429744336. 








Figure 5.  Brazilian GDP 1990–201685 
Although lower commodity prices, a reduction in domestic demand, monetary 
policy, and financing costs are cited as the chief reasons for the downturn (see Figure 6), 
total investment has declined by an average of six percent since 2014.  According to the 
European Central Bank,  
 
 
                                                 




Figure 6.  Brazil’s GDP Composition 2012–201586 
Total investment has declined by 6 percent on average since early 2014, partly 
due to developments at Petrobras, the public oil producer, which accounts for 10% of 
total Brazilian investment and almost 2 percent of GDP. The company had to cut 
investment by 33 percent in both 2014 and 2015 to adjust to lower oil prices and also in 
response to a widespread corruption case, triggering confidence effects throughout the 
economy. The direct and indirect effects of the decline in investment by Petrobras have 
been estimated by Brazil’s Ministry of Finance to have subtracted around 2 percentage 
points from GDP growth in 2015.  
In addition to the domestic issues that Brazil faces looking ahead, the country can 
also expect increased scrutiny from the international community as well as lower 
confidence in investments, which could exacerbate the economic slump. 
In addition to the financial toll that the Petrobras scandal wreaked on the 
country’s economy, several other entities were affected. The company had plans to 
expand its enterprise, but now several projects remain on hiatus, with their futures 
uncertain. Four construction firms that colluded with the oil company in the scandal have 
                                                 
86 Source: European Central Bank. 
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filed for bankruptcy and left thousands unemployed and will ultimately lead to an 
estimated $13.6 billion in assistance from federal funds.87 As economist Alex Wolf at 
Standard Life Investments stated regarding the scandal, “Brazil’s problems are all 
domestic and you can trace it to Petrobras. Consumer sentiment is down, unemployment 
is up slightly and investment is still down. We think Brazil is one of the most vulnerable 
emerging markets around.”88 With consumer confidence at an all-time low and the 
economic stagnation that the country has experienced since 2015, Brazil has a rough road 
ahead. Lava Jato was just the tip of the iceberg.  
3. Odebrecht 
As the investigation of graft proceeded to unfold, scores of other scandals came to 
light. One of the biggest firms implicated in the scandal was the gigantic Brazilian 
construction company Odebrecht. As if the Lava Jato case was not far-reaching enough, 
this discovery uncovered the involvement of several other top-level policy makers in 12 
countries—all at the expense of their taxpayers.89 Odebrecht simply took the same 
system that it used in its scandal with Petrobras, and plugged it into other countries. 
In 1944, Noberto Odebrecht was able to keep his father’s construction firm, 
Emílio Odebrecht & Cia, afloat by securing funds from a state bank.90 Noberto was then 
able to found a new company in the northeastern city of Salvador and absorb the assets 
from his father’s company. That construction company was the foundation from which a 
fifteen-division conglomerate now known as Odebrecht SA was formed and now spans 
across 21 countries.91  
From its humble beginnings, Odebrecht enjoyed decades of growth as 
government contracts for the construction of power plants, pipelines, canals, and oil wells 
                                                 
87 Segal, “Petrobras Oil Scandal Leaves Brazilians Lamenting a Lost Dream.” 
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were awarded to the company through the political influence of Petrobras, including the 
Airport in Rio de Janeiro and the Angra Nuclear Power Plant.92 As the company grew, it 
was able to use political clout to secure contracts for projects throughout South America, 
Africa, and Russia. Emílio’s son, Marcelo, succeeded his father as CEO in 1991 and was 
introduced shortly thereafter to Luiz Inácio Lula Da Silva, the future president of Brazil, 
who had just been released from jail by the military regime in power.93 Marcelo was 
impressed by Lula and began contributing to his political campaigns—a practice that is 
completely legal in Brazil—with the hope that his monetary donations would be 
remembered and reciprocated with favors. Truth be told, Odebrecht was not the only 
construction company that contributed to political campaigns. The builders that would 
later be investigated for their role in the Petrobras scandal, contributed the equivalent of 
$153.9 million dollars during an election year to several political parties—half of which 
went to three parties involved in the corruption scandal, with Odebrecht and its 
subsidiaries contribution totaling $39.3 million dollars.94  
The contributions made during Lula’s presidential bid paid off, allowing Marcelo 
Odebrecht to grow his company even faster. President Lula won by a landslide in 2002 
and began negotiations for contracts on several key infrastructure projects designed to 
modernize the country. Odebrecht won several of those contracts through the use of the 
cartel scheme exposed in the Lava Jato case. One of these contracts was for a Petrobras 
oil refinery located near Recife, in the northeastern corner of Brazil. The Abreu e Lima 
refinery was a keystone project for Lula’s Import Substitution Industrialization (ISI) 
model—one that would serve to meet the demand for oil products in northern Brazil and 
reduce the reliance on foreign oil.95 In 2007, top executives for Odebrecht and Petrobras 
began selling overpriced contracts, which were given to firms involved in the scheme and 
subsequently charged bribes of up to three percent for accepting the inflated project.96 
                                                 
92 Smith, Valle, and Schmidt. 
93 Smith, Valle, and Schmidt. 
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95 “Abreu e Lima Refinery: Main Operations,” Petrobras, accessed March 7, 2018, 
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The payments were then divided via doleiros among the Workers Party (PT) and the 
Popular Socialist Party (PPS) as well as the individuals involved in the scheme (see 
Figure 7).97 
 
Figure 7.  Odebrecht-Abreu e Lima Scheme Explained98 
The refinery project raised eyebrows from the beginning. The bids were strangely 
close to the maximum allowed and the government auditors warned that contractors were 
overcharging for the project.99 The Brazilian Congress voted to halt the project until it 
could be reviewed—a motion that Lula used his executive power to veto—assuring 
                                                 
97 Smith, Valle, and Schmidt. 
98 Source: Smith, Valle, and Schmidt. 
99 Smith, Valle, and Schmidt. 
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Congress that “every real would be spent wisely by Petrobras,” and that Dilma Rousseff, 
then Lula’s chief of staff and chairman of Petrobras, “would make sure of it.”100 
Construction continued and the plant was completed in 2014, vastly over budget. In fact, 
the cost of the refinery had set Petrobras back $18.5 billion, just about eight times the 
original projections.101 The Abreu e Lima project wreaked havoc on the company and 
tarnished the names of several top directors and politicians, but it was only one case 
among a laundry list of other projects that exceeded initial cost estimates. From 
highways, to airports and soccer stadiums, Odebrecht was able to bribe officials and 
circumvent the law in order to win bids for contracts and put cash in the pockets of their 
executives. Corruption became systemic and paying bribes was seen as a routine part of 
the deal-making process.  
 
 
Figure 8.  Abreu e Lima Refinery Located in Pernambuco102 
In December of 2016, the case gained international attention when the United 
States Department of Justice held a trial in which Odebrecht SA pleaded guilty to bribery 
charges. The company is now faced with a “combined total penalty of $3.5 billion to 
resolve charges with authorities in the United States, Brazil and Switzerland arising out 
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of their schemes to pay hundreds of millions of dollars in bribes to government officials 
around the world.”103 According to admissions, “Odebrecht paid approximately $788 
million in bribes to government officials, their representatives and political parties in a 
number of countries in order to win business in those countries.”104 It is evident that there 
are several shortcomings not only in policy that allowed these transactions to occur, but 
also with the normative culture of business that has engulfed Brazilian corporations. 
Besides the monetary impact that this scandal has made on the Brazilian 
economy, there are several examples of collateral damage that plague the region as a 
result (see Figure 9). In February 2017, the home of former Peruvian president Alejandro 
Toledo (2001-2006) was raided for allegedly accepting an Odebrecht bribe but managed 
to flee the country before being detained.105 In March of 2017, Colombian president Juan 
Manuel Santos (2006-2009) confessed that his election campaign received donations 
from Odebrecht in exchange for several construction contracts from the Colombian 
government.106 Panamanian officials have charged 17 executives and former public 
officials with money laundering who have ties with Odebrecht—even while the company 
has $3.3 billion in projects in progress as of January 2017.107 Ecuador’s Vice President 
Jorge Glas was also found guilty of “illicit association” at the end of 2017 after it was 
discovered that he exploited his public position to allow fellow policy makers to award 
contracts for large public construction projects in exchange for payments from 
Odebrecht.108 In short, corruption has an impact far beyond Brazil. 
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Figure 9.  Bribes Paid by Odebrecht109 
Within Brazil’s own borders, several lawmakers have been implicated in the 
scandal and face fines and even jail time for their roles. Former Brazilian president Lula 
was sentenced to 12 years for his involvement in the scandal.110 Dilma Rousseff has also 
been indirectly linked to the scandal along with several other congressmen who have 
been accused of accepting bribes from Odebrecht and have been forced to step down 
from their positions. Eduardo Cunha, former speaker of the house, received a 15-year 
sentence for charges related to money laundering bribes involving Petrobras, Odebrecht 
and several other politicians.111 Even Brazil’s current president, Michel Temer, is having 
a hard time maintaining his cabinet as five members have resigned after bribery 
allegations surfaced about their involvement in the scandal.112 These are just the latest 
convictions of a scandal that lasted two decades and spanned several continents.  
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Corruption is the most prominent issue in Latin America today. It is an issue that 
clearly affects security, economic growth, development of human capital, health care, 
democracy and Latin American’s faith in their government.113 At the international level, 
it hinders economic growth due to the low confidence investors have that their 
investment will grow. Domestically, and especially in the case of Brazil, it results in 
inflated prices for inferior quality infrastructure projects. At the individual level, it affects 
the quality of life of the people that depend on the government for support. Good 
governance, transparency, and mechanisms for accountability are crucial in order to 
create an environment where corruption can be contained. Although it is nearly 
impossible to measure the true cost of corruption, the economic toll that it takes on a 
country can have devastating effects. Brazil has a long road ahead as it recovers from this 
string of corruption scandals that have rocked the nation. Other countries can learn from 
the processes implemented in Brazil while also avoiding the mistakes that need to be 
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III. WHY NOW? 
The question that this chapter addresses is why Brazil’s endemic corruption 
problems are only now being exposed. Corruption has been a perennial issue throughout 
Brazil’s history. It has been a persistent concern at all levels of government and Brazilian 
policy makers have enjoyed a seemingly untouchable level of impunity from the early 
days of its colonial period until the Mensalão, Odebrecht, and especially the Lava Jato 
scandal emerged in early 2014.While there are several theories to explain this change, 
there are also several elements that stand out as the most likely impetus for this 
transformation. This chapter identifies the two factors that, based on my research,  
I believe offer the most compelling explanation behind the uncovering and castigation of 
political corruption in Brazil.  
A. PLEA BARGAINING 
Probably the most influential mechanism for exposing the endemic corruption 
problem in Brazilian politics cited by those involved in the investigations was the 
institution of delação premiada—or the plea bargain. According to one source, drawing 
on the example of the US, “plea bargaining is a defining, if not the defining, feature of 
the present federal criminal justice system.”114 In a plea bargain, a defendant is faced 
with a criminal charge that has a corresponding punishment such as a fine or jail time if 
the case goes to trial. The defendant is given an opportunity by the prosecution to plead 
guilty to a lesser charge with a smaller punishment in exchange for information regarding 
the case. In the United States, for one, the overwhelming majority of cases—about 90 to 
95 percent—avoid trial and result in a plea bargain.115 
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Although plea bargaining is a common practice in the United States, it was only 
introduced in Brazil in 1990 as a response to a series of violent crimes.116 When first 
introduced, the generic format of the legislation allowed for varying degrees of latitude in 
interpretation and application. Additionally, as highlighted by Delton Dallagnol, the 
federal prosecutor handling the Lava Jato cases pointed out that only three percent of 
corruption cases in Brazil ended up without a conviction and most of those accused rarely 
even go to trial.117 Judge Sérgio Moro, who would later become the judge over the same 
cases argued in 2004 that, “plea bargaining is not frequently applied in Brazilian judicial 
practice, perhaps because of the relatively inefficient criminal justice system. There is no 
reason for those under investigation to confess and try to obtain a benefit if there are low 
chances that they will be subjected to effective judicial action, now or in the near 
future.”118 Several pieces of legislation were passed in recent years that gradually 
expanded its reach and allowed it to become an essential tool in the pursuit of justice, 
primarily in white-collar crimes.  
Probably one of the most formative additions came in 2013, when Congress 
passed the “Law against Organized Crime,” which defined organized crime as an act 
“committed by four or more people” and established a system of incentives that allowed 
people to disclose information that could be used to convict other people engaged in 
illicit activity.119 Additionally, other key pieces of legislation were passed such as the 
Anti-Corruption Law (12.846) and Criminal Organizations Law (12.850), both in 2013 
that contributed to harsher sentencing in corruption trials.120 An update in 2014 further 
allowed for the plea bargain agreements to be confirmed by the judge during the trial 
phase which provides assurance to the accused that the deal will not be voided after he or 
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she has provided evidence.121 These key pieces of legislation dramatically changed the 
precedent in punishing those charged with corruption and compelled them to seek 
leniency in exchange for incriminating other accomplices.  
In Brazil, plea bargaining is carried out in a slightly different manner than in the 
United States. Rather than a straight exchange for a reduced penalty, several stipulations 
must be met before a prosecution will consider a reduced sentence. The defendant must: 
identify the conspirators and indicate which crimes were committed; reveal the hierarchal 
structure and the division of responsibilities within the organization; return, in whole or 
in part, the products of the crimes committed by the conspirators or; prevent future 
criminal acts from being committed by the perpetrators.122 Prior to this law being 
introduced, making a confession or accusation would not necessarily result in a reduction 
in penalty or a pardon, even if the prosecutor had previously offered it.123 Additionally, 
before the advent of the plea bargain, defendants could lie or tell half-truths because there 
were no negative consequences for doing so. As a result, it behooves the defendant to be 
compliant and truthful throughout the trial proceedings, but also to cooperate with 
officials during the investigation. Plea bargains have proven to be instrumental in 
uncovering corruption and are attributed with the success of recent investigations. 
1. The Plea Bargain in the Lava Jato Scandal 
Since the introduction of plea bargaining into the Brazilian judicial system, there 
are several examples of how it has been used to expose instances of corruption. Perhaps 
the most notorious instance was in the case of the Lava Jato Operation. As explained in 
the previous chapter, the Lava Jato scandal was an over-bidding operation where 
executives from the state-owned oil company Petrobras, accepted bribes in exchange for 
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contracts to construction firms at inflated prices. Also known as Petrolão—or big oil—
this scheme was responsible for $27 billion in lost GDP.124  
After being implicated in the money laundering investigation with Alberto 
Youssef, Paulo Roberto Costa was arrested and brought in for questioning. A plea deal 
was arranged, and both Costa and Youssef revealed essential information regarding the 
operation as well as evidence connecting several politicians to the scheme.125 These 
details led to the result of Senator Delcídio do Amaral, who served as the Workers’ Party 
leader in the upper house and the operation began snowballing from there. Amaral agreed 
to cooperate with investigators in exchange for leniency and implicated high-level 
politicians and executives who were involved in the Petrobras corruption scheme 
including former President Lula, and the then current president Rousseff.126 At the time 
of writing this thesis, there have been 158 plea agreements associated with the Lava Jato 
scandal which have been responsible for 207 arrest warrants and the recovery of $3.2 
billion in government funds (see Figure 10).127 
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Figure 10.  Lava Jato Outcomes128 
As one scholar points out, “[Operation Lava Jato] could never have gotten as far 
as it did without the incentives established by the system of plea bargaining.”129 As of 
June 2016, plea bargains have attributed to: 608 searches and seizures; 73 preventive 
arrests, 87 temporary detentions, six arrests in flagrante; 108 international legal 
cooperation requests; 43 criminal charges against 212 people; total amount of claimed so 
far 37.6 billion Brazilian reais in indemnification (approximately $10 billion); and 106 
criminal convictions.130 Additionally, it presents a feasible solution to the severely 
overload justice system in Brazil where recent estimates indicate that there are currently 
two pending lawsuits for every Brazilian citizen—an insurmountable number that 
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impedes the timeliness and efficiency of the system.131 The institution of the plea bargain 
has positively reconfigured the structure within Brazil’s judicial system and created a 
system that encourages collaboration with investigators, obstructs impunity, and keeps 
investigations from becoming lost in the bureaucracy of the bottlenecked judicial system. 
2. Opposition to Plea Bargaining 
Although plea bargaining has brought many individuals accused of corruption to 
justice, it is also attracting some opposition. Critics claim that the law gives the 
impression that authorities are not able to thoroughly investigate criminal organizations 
themselves and that they are instead forced to bargain with accused perpetrators and 
accept their assistance in exchange for impunity.132 Furthermore, an over-reliance on plea 
bargains have been said to give incentives to criminals to divulge false information in an 
attempt to receive shorter jail terms or even for the sake of revenge on an enemy.133 One 
scholar notes that “defendants and victims are not even required to testify truthfully 
before a judge, and other witnesses’ testimony is often deemed unreliable, so judges tend 
not to convict someone purely on the basis of witness testimony.”134 The legal system of 
the United States, Lorenzon further argues, “emphasizes cross examination and imposes 
penalties for perjury,” while Brazil’s system “incentivizes testimonial falsehoods, which 
makes oral testimony unreliable.”135 Finally, the defense lawyer of the accused many 
times is not afforded the opportunity to question him or her directly in order to determine 
the veracity of the allegations—a circumstance that is avoided because it denied the 
accused the right to a fair trial.136  
Some of the most aggressive criticism on the use of plea bargains have come from 
the former PT government. According to an open letter written by PT lawyers and 
endorsed by the president of the party, Rui Falcão called attention to what he called 
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“forced plea bargains” and how they are being used solely as a tool to undermine the PT. 
Falcão calls the plea bargain “an arbitrary and absolutist judicial action, incompatible 
with the role that is expected to be played by a judge, in the exercise of the Rule of 
Law.”137 Former President Lula has also denounced plea bargaining and claims that its 
use within the judiciary is an attempt to criminalize his party and prohibit him from 
running as a candidate in the 2018 election.138 Other opponents of plea bargains also 
argue that the current form of the practice allows for its use when already in prison 
(equating to a real life prisoner’s dilemma) and that this gives incentive to make false 
accusations since the accuser has everything to gain and nothing to lose by implicating 
others.139 Regardless of the view that one adopts concerning the plea bargain, its 
effectiveness has suddenly shaken the usually slow-paced judicial process in Brazil and 
has been a major force in shaping the anticorruption framework in Brazil. It has resulted 
in the ousting of several key players in the war against corruption and is expected to 
remain one of the integral tools of the Brazilian criminal justice system.  
B. THE MEDIA 
Another factor that has had a significant influence on the emergence of corruption 
is the media. Independent media can represent a non-electoral form of oversight that can 
enable the enforcement of accountability between elections, acting as a type of “social 
accountability.”140 Additionally, as Cristiana Matei notes, media is often viewed as a 
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complementary force to the three branches of government in providing informal external 
oversight.141 She continues: 
The informal oversight carried out by the media usually occurs through 
the lens of scandal, such as the exposure of human rights abuses, 
misappropriation of funds, or other such violations which may force the 
formal control and oversight mechanisms to do their job more effectively, 
that is, to start investigations, reprimand wrongdoing, and change 
legislation. Media thus sounds “fire alarms” that may motivate the official 
branches of the government to take appropriate actions.142 
1. The Media in Brazil 
In Brazil specifically, the media has a remarkable influence on how citizens view 
politics. According to one study, more than 85 percent of respondents reported that they 
considered television to be their most primary source of information for political 
events.143 Journalists and broadcasters are also considered to be more trustworthy sources 
than political institutions themselves.144  
Brazil is home to two major broadcasting stations, the most recognizable of which 
is Rede Globo. During the 1989 presidential campaign which Fernando Collor de Mello 
would eventually win, viewership was consistently higher than 59 percent of the 
population and “as high as 84 percent during prime time.”145 This domination of the 
airwaves has allowed the network an unrivaled amount of power and influence over the 
Brazilian population, including the ability to frame elections and cover other issues that 
were advantageous to its clientelistic relationship with government. In fact, in 2013, 
Globo admitted to supporting Brazil’s military dictatorship during its control of the 
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government from 1964 to1985.146 While television has served as one of the principal 
means of conveying information to the population, the advent of the internet has allowed 
other forms of media to enter the scene. Platforms such as Facebook, Twitter, and 
YouTube have diminished the quasi-monopolistic hold that television has had on 
delivering information to the public and given the Brazilian people a way to voice their 
own opinions. 
Brazilians are increasingly becoming the most connected people in the world. As 
of 2013, almost 79 percent of internet users in the country (roughly 78 million people) 
were on social media (see Figure 11).147 This is in addition to the fact that Brazil 
accounts for 65 million Facebook users,148 and 41.2 million Twitter users,149 second only 
to the United States on both platforms. Not only do Brazilians account for a large 
percentage of the social media use, they are also spending a lot of time there. One study 
in 2013 showed that the average time spent on Facebook increased to 535 minutes per 
month—a 208 percent increase from the previous year while global use declined by two 
percent for the same timeframe (see Figure 12).150 Due to the increased penetration of the 
internet in the country, Brazilians no longer have to rely on one media source for their 
news. These social media platforms have also proven useful in acting as a virtual meeting 
place, where citizens can exchange opinions regarding public events of political 
significance.151 
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Figure 11.  Social Media Users in Brazil 2011–2017152 
 
 
Figure 12.  Time spent on the Internet 2010–2012153 
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Such is the case with corruption in Brazil as media has been used as a way to 
enforce accountability. As previously mentioned, Fernando Collor won the Brazilian 
presidency in 1989 on the widespread perception of corruption within the previous 
administration. Ironically, just two years after taking office, the president was impeached 
on charges of corruption after being implicated in a bribery scheme involving 
government funds. According to Richard Foster, editor of the executive newsletter Brazil 
Watch, the impeachment never would have happened without the press.154 One of the 
major newspapers in Brazil, the Folha de São Paulo, ran a report soon after his 
inauguration alleging that his “first government contracts for advertising were awarded 
without bidding and under questionable circumstances.”155 Several months later, the 
magazine Veja, ran a story containing an interview with Pedro Collor, the president’s 
brother, confirming the allegations which spurred further media attention and forced the 
lower house of Congress to form an investigative committee to look into the matter.156 In 
an attempt to discredit the accusations, President Collor sued the news organizations for 
defamation and ordered government auditors to inspect their finances.157 Despite the 
harassment, the news media was relentless in keeping the public’s attention on the 
situation. 
The Collor impeachment was a monumental moment in Brazil’s history. It was 
the first time that a president had been impeached since its transition to democracy in 
1985. It was also one of the rare instances that the judicial process was able to run its 
course and a member of the political elite was held accountable. However, it should be 
highlighted that President Collor was still able to subvert the rule of law to a certain 
extent. As the trial progressed, and it became clear that he would be impeached, Collor 
chose to resign thereby technically avoiding impeachment from office and possibly 
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avoiding a bar on holding public office for eight years under Brazilian law.158 Although 
the Senate ended up convicted him, his criminal case was thrown out on a technicality 
and he was able to avoid jail time. Thus we see that while the press in a fundamental 
factor in the exposition of corruption, the pursuit of justice requires other forces to act as 
well. 
2. Effect of the Media on Exposing Corruption 
Although freedom of the press was ranked as “partly free” in 2017 and given a 
total score of 47 by Freedom House,159 it is becoming substantially less free. Just 15 
years prior, in 2002, Brazil was given a total score of 32 and was noted as making great 
strides in privatizing the media and responsible for playing a central role in exposing 
corruption.160 Additionally, Reporters Without Borders ranks Brazil 102 out of 180 
countries in their annual World Press Freedom Index, labeling the country as “more 
insecure than ever.”161 The downward trend162 in freedom for the press is attributed to an 
escalation of threats and attacks against journalists who have reported significant 
corruption scandals. Furthermore, journalists have faced increased pressure from the 
courts which attempt to constrain their ability to deliver accurate information to the 
populous. “Judicial censorship—in which courts bar media outlets from publishing 
information about prominent politicians and businesspeople, demand the removal of 
published material, or order journalists to pay hefty fines for disseminating information,” 
and remains a common theme due to the manifestation of multiple corruption schemes.163 
Although the media is facing multiple challenges, there are a number of promising policy 
changes that have been made that seek to relax the constraints imposed upon the press. 
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Additionally, several online sources, both publicly and privately funded, have been 
launched that seek to aid in the dissemination of information regarding public funds.164 
By looking back at some of the instances of corruption exposure during the last 
two decades or so, one can clearly see the undeniable role that the media played in calling 
attention to the problem of impunity and garnering support from the public. Due to its 
recent transition to democracy, image as an up-and-coming world power, and strong 
economic performance, Brazil has often been the subject of interest in the international 
media. Domestically, there have been several instances of the media acting as a watchdog 
to call attention to nefarious political activity. 
3. Role of the Media in the Mensalão Scandal 
In May 2005, Veja magazine released a video in which a post office official 
Mauricio Marinho (head of the Department of Materials Procurement and Management), 
appeared to be negotiating bribes with companies interested in bidding for government 
projects.165 In the recording, Marinho said that he acted in the name of Deputy Roberto 
Jefferson, then president of the PT. This article published by Veja was the beginning of 
what would be the biggest revelation in government corruption since the impeachment of 
President Fernando Collor. Following the exposure of the vote-buying scheme, President 
Lula’s most influential cabinet member, Chief of Staff José Dirceu, resigned.166 A special 
joint congressional committee was formed and the body then named 18 deputies who 
received Mensalão payments.167  
With a presidential election on the horizon the following year, PT members were 
determined to squash the scandal and drown it with bureaucracy. They were successful to 
a certain extent, as Lula was reelected to serve a second term. However, the media 
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coverage was incessant and it allowed the case to gather more public attention and helped 
the prosecution to gradually move forward. The public was outraged, and the fervor 
stoked a flurry of initiatives with the purpose of bolstering accountability, both in and 
outside of government. One of the most significant of these was the 2010 Ficha Limpa—
or the Clean Slate—which was signed by 1.3 million citizens and prohibited the election 
of politicians with criminal records—much to the chagrin of high-level policy makers.168 
Another bill made its way through congress roughly during the same time period and was 
eventually signed into law in 2012 by President Dilma Rousseff. This piece of legislation 
guaranteed “public access to documents from the executive, legislative, and judicial 
branches of government at the federal, state, and municipal levels. It also provided for 
access to information about private entities that receive public funding.”169 The media 
played a major role in keeping the attention of the public and maintaining the momentum 
of a demand of more accountability. 
As the Mensalão scandal seemed to be dragging on, Brazilians were convinced 
that once again the case would “end up in pizza,” or that the elite would be able to find a 
“jeitinho” to subvert the law. A survey conducted by Data Folha indicated that while 
73% of Brazilians believed that those accused of participating in the scandal should be 
sent to jail, only 11% believed that they actually would be punished.170 The trial played 
out like a television series and gripped the attention of its audience as explained by 
Gregory Michener and Carlos Pereira: 
Televised and widely watched, the trial highlighted the confrontations of 
two Supreme Court justices, Joaquim Barbosa and Ricardo Lewandowski, 
who took opposite sides on virtually every decision. Barbosa, the trial’s 
“reporting justice,” responsible for reviewing the evidence and confirming 
charges, was the Supreme Court’s first and only black justice. Barbosa 
rose from humble origins to spend his career defending “fundamental 
rights” as a prosecutor in the office of Brazil’s powerful public 
prosecutor’s office. Lewandowski was the trial’s “revising justice,” 
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responsible for assessing the pre-trial decisions of Barbosa. In contrast to 
his colleague, Lewandowski had spent most of his professional career as a 
judge in wealthy São Paulo state. The vituperative exchanges between 
these two justices on the floor of the court, which were aired regularly on 
nightly newscasts, proved a distinctive feature of the case.171 
For Brazilians, this dichotomy was more than just a trial. It was a metaphor for the two 
sides of Brazil; “one in which privilege had always defended its own kind, the other, a 
marginalized Brazil hungry for justice and an end to impunity.”172  
The role of the media in the Mensalão scandal cannot be overstated. It was an 
essential factor in exposing not only the key players and their nefarious activity, but also 
in keeping the momentum throughout the drawn-out bureaucratic processes. It is 
important to note that while much attention is given in this section to newspapers, 
magazines, and television, there was also a large movement on social media. In fact, in 
late 2013 an amendment to the constitution was made eliminating secret voting in 
Congress. This measure garnered support, in part, through social media sites like 
Facebook, where 700,000 individuals pledged their support of the law.173 Social media 
sites are also cited as the main medium for organizing demonstrations such as the one in 
2013, which began as a protest against the price increase for transportation but morphed 
into a general demonstration of discontent against poor public services and corruption of 
the country’s leaders.174 While the media gained much traction during the Mensalão 
trials, it would not be the last time that the media would serve as an important factor in 
the discovery of corruption. 
4. Role of the Media in Operation Lava Jato  
The Lava Jato case was another instance where the media was instrumental in not 
only exposing, but deepening the investigation and enabling the prosecution of graft. As 
previously outlined, Lava Jato began as an investigation of a previously known money 
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launderer, Alberto Youssef. After being brought in for questioning and implicating 
dozens of other high-level policy makers in exchange for a softer sentence, investigators 
soon realized that Youssef was involved in a much bigger operation.  
As Sérgio Moro, the federal judge put in charge of the case, began ordering the 
arrest of several business executives, bankers, and politicians implicated through plea 
deals, the media frenzy became intense. The arrests were quite dramatic: “One suspect 
took his private jet to Curitiba to turn himself in. Another spent his last hours of freedom 
in a hotel suite on Rio de Janeiro’s fabled Ipanema beach to avoid being taken from his 
home handcuffed.”175 Others were caught while trying to flee the country. The 
testimonies of the accused were recorded and uploaded to various websites including 
YouTube.176 The attention the case was getting served to elevate Judge Moro to celebrity 
status—an avenging hero for the Brazilian people and someone who was finally holding 
the elite accountable for their actions. His status became so renowned that his image has 
now become an iconic symbol for justice and is printed on T-shirts, bearing the slogan 
“In Moro We Trust.” 
 
Figure 13.  Judge Sérgio Moro177 
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On March 13, 2016, indignation reached a peak when senior politicians were 
implicated in the Lava Jato scheme and hundreds of thousands of Brazilians took to the 
streets demanding the impeachment of President Dilma Rousseff and the arrest of former 
President Lula. Sergio Moro, although reluctant to become the face of the mobilization, 
seized the opportunity to address the demonstrators: 
On the 13th, the Brazilian people took to the streets. Among various 
reasons, to protest against the corruption that has embedded itself in our 
institutions and the market. I was touched by the support for the 
investigations of the so-called, operation Lava Jato.  Despite the various 
references to my name, I pay tribute to the kindness of the Brazilian 
people, to the success of a robust institutional work that involves the 
Federal Police, the Federal Public Ministry, and the judiciary. It is 
important that the elected authorities and the parties hear the voice of the 
streets and also commit themselves to the fight against corruption, 
reinforcing our institutions and weeding out the bad apples completely, 
because as of now it is almost exclusively initiative of the instances of 
control. There is no future with systemic corruption that destroys our 
democracy, our economic well-being, and our dignity as a country.178 
Just three days following the protests, Judge Moro released a slew of telephone 
recordings of Lula that indicated that he and Rousseff had discussed influencing judges 
and prosecutors involved in the Lava Jato scandal, which only served to fan the flames of 
the ongoing protests.179 Despite a formal written apology for the uproar he caused as a 
result of the leaks, Moro has always been an advocate for them. In 2004, he wrote an 
article regarding the Mani Pulite (Clean Hands) investigation that looked into political 
corruption in Italy and argued “leaks served a useful purpose. The constant flow of 
revelations kept the public’s interest high and party leaders on the defensive.”180 
Although Rousseff, who unlike Lula was not under investigation, claimed that the 
recordings were made illegally, Moro defended his decision to release them, writing that 
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“democracy in a free society requires that the governed know what their governors are 
doing, even when they seek to act within the protections of the shadows.”181 Judge Moro 
has often been criticized for being overzealous with his position on transparency, 
“pushing the boundaries of the law,” and using the media to polarize public opinion.182 
But Moro remains steadfast in his use of the media to inform the Brazilian population. 
Speaking at a press conference following the demonstrations in March 2016, he told 
reporters, “alone the justice system cannot resolve corruption, other institutions must 
work and the public must speak out.”183 Informing the public through the media was key 
in achieving this endeavor.  
Judge Moro has been able to expertly manage the Brazilian media to maintain the 
inertia started by his Lava Jato trials, but this case was just the tip of the iceberg. In 
addition to the use of media at the domestic level, huge bounds have been made at the 
international level as well. It has now been discovered that its tentacles have stretched 
over several continents and gripped the governments of at least a dozen countries. Lava 
Jato is no longer a Brazilian problem, but a global epidemic, and is responsible for the 
imprisonment of several business executives and looming impeachments of a few 
presidents. Once it was discovered that Lava Jato was an international corruption 
network, authorities began collaborating and sharing information in an attempt to 
understand the issue from a global perspective. A web of corruption as big as this case 
cannot be dealt with unilaterally. The same holds true for media coverage.  
In 2011, the Peruvian journalism organization IDL-Reporteros published a story 
on overcharges associated with the construction company Odebrecht.184 When the Lava 
Jato case began to emerge, it became evident that it was a transnational case that had 
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international implications. It was at this point that international journalistic collaboration 
became a necessity in order to uncover the corruption and bring it into global focus. 
Instead of relying upon correspondents in Brazil to relay the information, journalists 
began to collaborate and organize investigative journalistic teams to examine the 
allegations in greater detail. “General journalism in Latin America was not producing 
coverage from the basis of investigative journalism, beyond the factual news, where data 
from Brazilian authorities or public institutions were regurgitated by the media outlets,” 
said Milagros Salazar, director of the Peruvian investigative journalism site Convoca, 
which has produced several special projects dedicated to the Lava Jato case.185 “Recently, 
most media outlets in the region, both traditional media and independent investigative 
journalism media, have begun to look at the subject in greater depth and to become 
interested in cases.”186  
Finally, in December of 2016, the U.S. Department of Justice released documents 
that contained the testimony of 77 executives of the conglomerate Odebrecht, in which 
they admitted paying about $788 million in bribes to 12 countries in Latin America and 
Africa.187 The documentary evidence was made available to Brazilian authorities as well 
as to the prosecution teams of other affected countries, but it was very difficult for 
uninvolved entities to obtain, including the media. One Brazilian newspaper, the Folha 
de São Paulo, was able to obtain these documents from the Supreme Court of Brazil and 
share them with colleagues from other countries.188 These alliances then became force 
multipliers and these shared documents sparked a series of investigative reports focused 
on the intricacies within each country (see Figure 14). Reporters from all over Latin 
America began examining the implications of the scandal within their own borders. 
Additionally, courses and seminars were organized such as the Latin American Meeting 
of Investigative Journalists on Illicit Financial Flows organized by Convoca and the 
nonprofit Red Latinoamericana sobre Deuda, Desarrollo y Derechos (Latindadd) where 
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journalists met and shared information relevant to their individual and collective 
corruption cases.189 These conferences continue to serve to establish and maintain the 




Figure 14.  Media Network Covering the Lava Jato Operation190 
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190 Source: Linares. 
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C. SUMMARY 
As this section has illustrated, institutions such as the plea bargain and the media 
have had a profound effect on the exposure of graft and served as major drivers for its 
prosecution and punishment. In an epoch when democratic institutions in Brazil are still 
in their infancy and four out of every ten congressmen are being investigated for 
participating in criminal activity, it is imperative that corruption is identified and 
prosecuted.191 These two instruments have allowed Brazil to able to build some 
momentum in this direction. While plea bargains and use of the media are not solely 
responsible for the manifestation of political corruption in Brazil, they are certainly the 
two principal factors that contributed to its uncovering. Ultimately, the plea bargain and 
exposure in the media of wrongdoing and corruption has led to a more responsive 
government in Brazil. This inertia must be continued through public outcry. According to 
Judge Sérgio Moro, “Brazil’s judiciary will not end systemic corruption unless society 
also demands change.”192 Brazil has experienced an increase in societal participation 
within the last decade. This phenomenon has led to not only an increased interest in 
politics, but also an increased demand for accountability for policy makers in key 
positions.  
There are still many policies within the Brazilian judicial system that impede 
progress. One of these is foro privilegiado, which allows for special treatment of high-
level politicians and ensures that their cases are only heard by the Supreme Court. This 
political privilege policy has only constrained the already backlogged court system and 
allowed those accused of corruption to remain free. This jeitinho—little gimmick or 
angle—has forced many Brazilians to wonder if Operation Lava Jato is a singular 
extraordinary event, or a marker for a real change in accountability among Brazilian 
policy makers. While the Mensalão and Lava Jato cases were a step in the right direction, 
it is still too early to tell if it will drastically alter the status quo. 
 
                                                 
191 Eduardo Militão, Edson Sardinha, and Rodolfo Torres, “Número De Parlamentares Investigados 
Bate Recorde,” Congresso em Foco, September 25, 2013, http://congressoemfoco.uol.com.br/noticias/
numero-de-parlamentares-investigados-bate-recorde/. 
192 Stauffer, “Brazil Judge Says Public Outcry Needed to End Corruption.” 
 52 
THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK  
 53 
IV. CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
Corruption is one of the most harmful and widespread concerns Brazil is facing 
today. It has penetrated both the public and private sectors as well as eroded the faith of 
the Brazilian people in their country’s leaders and institutions. Since 2014, the country’s 
international reputation has been marred by fraudulent and unethical behavior further 
exacerbated by economic recession and inflation. Despite efforts to display its progress in 
emergence to the world stage as an important actor—such as hosting the World cup in 
2014 and the Olympics in 2016—the events only seemed to magnify the problems hiding 
beneath the surface. 
This thesis sought to investigate reasons why manifestations of corruption, and 
responses to corruption in Brazil, have recently experienced a sharp increase particularly 
since 2014. This year has marked the beginning of what seems to be the beginning of a 
new era in public accountability in Brazilian politics. One corruption scandal after 
another seems to have been exposed since this period, implicating public servants and 
private sector executives alike. Brazil, once seen as a rising world power and a model for 
developing nations, is now embroiled in a heap of scandals that threatens its 
democracy.193 My research has indicated that the introduction of plea bargaining into the 
judicial system and the extensive use of media, including social media, are the two 
instruments that have had the most profound effect on the exposure of graft within 
Brazilian politics. It is imperative to emphasize however, that these two instruments are 
not solely responsible for the change. Rather they are the emblematic cover to a whole 
series of events and processes that have initiated a swing in Brazilian accountability.  
While this thesis has analyzed a few prominent corruption cases that have served 
to bring fraudulent and unethical behavior to the forefront, there are a multitude of other 
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scandals and events that have helped to push Brazilian’s endurance to the limit.194 
Equally important to acknowledge is the fact that all of the scandals addressed in this 
thesis are still being investigated and prosecuted. The repercussions of these 
investigations will certainly continue to transform the landscape of Brazilian politics.  
As prosecutions continue and fines, imprisonments, and other penalties are 
imposed upon the politicians and the businesses that have taken part in these corruption 
scandals, the country faces somewhat of a dilemma. Unemployment is currently at 13.4 
percent—the highest in South America.195 GDP growth rates have dipped into the red and 
remained consistently below expectations.196 The country also faces an aging population 
that is driving the pension and health systems further into deficit, all of which contribute 
to its serious economic predicament. These factors undoubtedly will prove to be a 
challenge to Brazil’s security and economic stability. Optimistically, and maybe even 
ironically, the negative attention drawn as a result of corruption exposure will serve as an 
impetus for change within the Brazilian political system.  
In order for Brazil to maintain the inertia that it has gained during the recent anti-
corruption probes, there must be a concerted effort to address the prevention of graft and 
increased focus on transparency. Brian Winter, editor-in-chief of America’s Quarterly 
magazine writes that “only by renouncing their special privileges and committing to 
genuine reform will Brazil’s politicians be able to ward off disaster and regain the 
public’s trust.”197 The first of the special privileges on the chopping block should be the 
foro privilegiado provision that gives exceptional standing to those in high-level 
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government positions and shields them from trial except by the Supreme Court. This law 
grants some 22,000 people immunity from normal court proceedings and is one of the 
major hindrances to prosecuting government officials on charges of corruption.198 
Abolishing it would require congressional action, as the provision is written into the 
constitution, but doing so would give the judicial sector greater autonomy and ability to 
pursue corruption.199 Although Brazil has made huge strides in mandating greater 
transparency as demonstrated by the passing of several pieces of freedom-of-information 
policies, algumas leis não pegam (some laws don’t quite catch on) as the Brazilians say. 
A greater effort needs to be concentrated on providing resources for actually enforcing 
these laws consistently.  
With public indignation increasing and the economy in a lull, Brazil’s democracy 
is in a fragile state. However, presidential elections are just around the corner later this 
year, and Brazilians have a rare opportunity. The people need to elect a new president 
that is untouched by the scandals that have recently plagued the political system and 
reinforce the commitment to reducing corruption in order to safeguard democracy. Public 
support is key in this endeavor and the outlook is promising. A recent survey revealed 
that over 77 percent of respondents considered the Lava Jato investigation to be the main 
concern of the year for the country.200 In another survey in 2016, 96 percent of 
respondents indicated they wanted Operation Lava Jato to continue regardless of the 
cost.201 Brazil’s new leadership needs to be tough on corruption and make radical 
changes throughout the government structure, regardless of the risk. Bolstered by this 
support, Brazil can reverse its dilemma and truly become a country of the future. 
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